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Abstract. In cryptanalysis, security of ciphers vis-a-vis attacks is gauged
against three criteria of complexities, i.e., computations, memory and
time. Some features may not be so apparent in a particular domain, and
their analysis in a transformed domain often reveals interesting patterns.
Moreover, the complexity criteria in different domains are different and
performance improvements are often achieved by transforming the prob-
lem in an alternate domain. Owing to the results of coding theory and
signal processing, Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) based attacks have
proven to be efficient than algebraic attacks in terms of their computa-
tional complexity. Motivated by DFT based attacks, we present a trans-
formed domain analysis of Linear Feedback Shift Register(LFSR) based
sequence generators. The time and frequency domain behavior of non-
linear filter and combiner generators is discussed along with some novel
observations based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT). CRT is
exploited to establish patterns in LFSR sequences and underlying cyclic
structures of finite fields. Application of DFT spectra attacks on com-
biner generators is also demonstrated. Our proposed method saves on
the last stage computations of selective DFT attacks for combiner gen-
erators. The proposed approach is demonstrated on some examples of
combiner generators and is scalable to general configuration of combiner
generators.
Keywords: LFSR, DFT, filter generator, combiner generator, CRT.
1 Introduction
LFSRs have been widely used for sequence generation due to their inbuilt re-
cursive structure, faster implementations and well studied behaviour in diverse
applications of communications, coding theory and cryptology. In cryptographic
algorithms, the linear recurrence of LFSRs is modified by nonlinear filtering to
achieve higher linear complexities and good statistical properties. Some of the
classical schemes include filter generators, combiner generators, clock controlled
generators and shrinking generators. The nonlinear function used in these gen-
erators is a boolean function f : GF (2n) → GF (2) which takes l inputs
from either an LFSR or from outputs of number of LFSRs and produces GF (2)
keystream sequence. LFSR based sequence generators serve as the basic building
blocks for a number of e-stream submissions [1] and cellular algorithms i.e. A5
series [2] and E0 algorithm [6].
2 M Asad, Fauzan Mirza, Amir A Khan
In many scientific applications, it is common to analyze a problem in differ-
ent domains because some characteristics of the involved parameters can only
be better revealed in a particular domain. Moreover, the computational require-
ments can be reduced as result of the analysis in some transformed domains.
For instance, the prorogation characteristics of light or magnetic waves can be
conveniently observed in frequency domain as compared to its equilvalent repre-
sentation in time domain. A continous signal in time domain s(t) = cos(2pifct)
having infinite non-zero points once converted to frequency domain S(f) has
only two non-zero frequency components i.e. fc and −fc. Similarly decoding of
Block codes like Bose, Chaudhuri, and Hocquenghem (BCH) codes and Reed
Solomon codes in frequency domain have proven to be more efficient in terms of
computational complexity and error free recovery as compared to its analogous
time domain decoding techniques [28]. Contemplating the same, analysis of cryp-
tographic primitives in transform domains has also produced promising results.
Though very less known in public literature, DFT based spectral attacks [19]
and transform domain analysis of DES cipher components [18] are interesting
examples in this regard.
In this report, analysis of LFSR based sequence generators in time and fre-
quency domains has been presented. Starting form time and frequency domain
analysis of basic LFSR sequences, we build our analysis onto filter and combiner
generators. In Section-2, basics of Fourier transform over finite fields is recalled.
Section-3 delineates the time and frequency domain analysis of LFSRs. Section-4
describes transform domain analysis of a simple product sequence which is fun-
damental component of non-linear boolean functions. A novel account of Chinese
Remainder Theorem (CRT) based interpretation of fixed patterns in cyclic struc-
tures of underlying finite fields is discussed in this section. In Section-5, time and
frequency domain analysis of non-linear filter generators is given with a perspec-
tive of their application in cryptographic algorithms. Specific comments about
selective DFT attacks on filter generators [19] are specifically made in this sec-
tion. Section-6 discusses transform domain analysis of combiner generators and
application of selective DFT attacks on combiner generators by exploiting mod-
ular computations of CRT alongwith detailed complexity comparison in relation
to classical divide and conquer attacks. In Section-7 discussion on applicability
of discrete fourier spectra attacks on A5/1 algorithm is made. The report is
finally concluded in section-8.
2 Frequency Domain Representation over Finite Fields
Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) is considered one of the most important dis-
covery in the area of signal processing. DFT presents us with an alternate math-
ematical tool that allows us to examine the frequency domain behaviour of sig-
nals, often revealing important information not apparent in time domain. DFT
Sk of an n-point sequence si is expressed in terms of inner product between the
sequence and set of complex discrete frequency exponentials:
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Sk =
n−1∑
i=0
sie
−j2piik/n, k = 0, 1, 2, ....., n− 1 (1)
The term e−j2piik/n represents discrete set of exponentials. Alternatively, e−j2pi/n
can be viewed as nth root of unity.
Analogous to the classical DFT, a DFT for a periodic signal st with period
n defined over a finite field GF (2m) is represented as
Sk =
n−1∑
t=0
stα
−tk, k = 0, 1, 2, ....., n− 1 (2)
where Sk is k-th frequency component of DFT and α is the primitive element;
generator ofGF (2m) with period n [23]. For Inverse DFT, we will have a relation
st =
n−1∑
k=0
Skα
tk, k = 0, 1, 2, ....., n− 1 (3)
Similarly for polynomials, we have a relation for DFT and IDFT. Having
a correspondence between a minimum polynomial and its associated sequence
st with s(x) =
∑n−1
t=0 stx
t and S(x) =
∑n−1
k=0 Skx
k, following relation holds for
DFT [15]:
Sk = s(α
−k), k = 0, 1, 2, ....., n− 1 (4)
and similarly for IDFT:
st = S(α
t), t = 0, 1, 2, ....., n− 1 (5)
3 Transformed Domain Analysis of LFSR Sequences
Classical theory on LFSR sequences and their applications in cryptology can be
found in [16], [15] and [27]. In this section, transformed domain analysis of
LFSRs, their sequences and underlying algebraic structures are recalled as they
are fundamental to our proposed approach on filter and combiner generators.
3.1 Time Domain Representation of an LFSR Sequence
A binary sequence st can be treated as an LFSR sequence of degree m if it
follows a linear recursion with coefficents from GF (2) as:
si+m =
m−1∑
k=0
cksi+k for i ≥ 0 (6)
The value m is called the order of recurrence and associated characteristic poly-
nomial in GF (2) is defined by
f(x) = xm +
m−1∑
k=0
cksi+k for i ≥ 0 (7)
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The initial state (s0, s1, ...., sm−1) of an LFSR serves as a key to generate
the complete sequence st . The period of any non-zero sequence can be ut-
most 2m − 1 which is in relation to the characteristic polynomial f(x) of the
LFSR. If f(x) is irreducible, it has m distint roots i.e. α and its conjugate set
{α, α2, α4, ..., α2
m−1
}. Consequently, if f(x) is a primitive polynomial, then or-
der of its root α must be 2m − 1 which in other words is a period of associated
sequence st. Thus a sequence st of an LFSR given by a primitive polynomial has
maximum possible period 2m − 1 and is called m-sequence.
Trace Representation of an LFSR Sequence. The same sequence st
can also be expressed in terms of its trace representation [24]; a linear operator
from GF (2m) to its subfiled GF (2) . Let Trm1 (x) =
∑m−1
k=0 x
2k be the trace
mapping from GF (2m) to GF (2), then m sequence st can be represented as:
st = Tr
m
1 (βα
t) (8)
where α is a generator of a cyclic group GF (2m)∗ and is called as primitive
element of GF (2m). Note that β ∈ GF (2m) and each of its nonzero value corre-
sponds to cyclic shift of the m-sequence generated by an LFSR with primitive
polynomial f(x). Importance of this interpretation of m-sequence is that differ-
ent sequences constructed from root α of primitive polynomial f(x) are cyclic
shifts of the same m-sequence. The associated linear space G(f) of dimension m
contains 2m different binary sequences including all 0s sequence as:
G(f) = { τ is | 0 ≤ i ≤ 2m − 2 }
⋃
{0} (9)
where τ is a left shift operator and represents a linear transformation of sequence
st. It is important to mention here that all sequences in G(f), defined over a
primitive polynomial f(x), have maximum period r i.e. 2m − 1 with an obvious
exception of all 0s sequence. Moreover, any two sequences s and u within G(f)
are cyclic shift equilvalent, if there exists an integer k such that
ui = si+k, ∀ i ≥ 0. (10)
LFSR Sequence in Matrix Form. Each state of an m stage LFSR is a
vector in the m-dimensional space GF (2m). The shift register is then a linear
operator that changes the current state to its successor vector according to the
feedback. In simple terms, the transformation of each non-zero sequence in a field,
from state (sk, sk+1, ...., sk+m−1) to its successor state (sk+1, sk+2, ...., sk+m) can
be regarded as a linear operation on GF (2m). The advantage of working with
operator operating on m−dimensional vector space is that it affords a matrix
representation. Since,
sm+k = c0sk + c1sk+1 + ...+ cm−1sk+m−1, k ≥ 0. (11)
hence a shift register matrix takes the form:
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T =


0 0 0 ... 0 c0
1 0 0 ... 0 c1
0 1 0 ... 0 c2
. . . ... . .
. . . ... . .
. . . ... . .
0 0 0 ... 1 cm−1


and
(sk+1, sk+2, ...., sk+m) = (sk, sk+1, ...., sk+m−1)T
= (sk−1, sk, ...., sk−1+m−1)T
2
= ...
= (s0, s1, ...., sm−1)T
k+1
The matrix T is called the state matrix of the LFSR in time domain. Note
that det(T ) = (−1)mc0. Thus T is invertible if and only if c0 6= 0.
3.2 Frequency Domain Representation of an LFSR Sequence
From (2), DFT of an LFSR sequence at defined over a primitive polynomial f(x)
produces a Fourier spectrum sequence Ak. For completeness, few important facts
are reproduced here from [5] and [21] with some novel observations as well:
1. The zero components in the Fourier spectrum of a sequence over GF (2m)
are related to the roots of a polynomial of that sequence. For example, DFT
of an LFSR sequence with feedback polynomial f(x) = x3+x+1 initialized
with state 001 is 0, 0, 0, α4, 0, α2, α. As roots of f(x) are α alongwith its
conjugates i.e. α2 and α4, so first, second and fourth spectral components
are zero.
2. As DFT of a time domain signal comprises of a fundamental frequency and
its harmonics, DFT of an LFSR sequence based on a minimal polynomial
with no multiple roots also comprises of αi ∈ GF (2m) and its harmonics
αi
jmod r ∈ GF (2m) with 0 ≤ i ≤ r − 1. This harmonic pattern can be
efficiently exploited in cryptanalysis attacks on LFSR based sequence gen-
erators.
3. All DFT components of an LFSR sequence ∈ GF (2m).
4. indices of non zero DFT points for LFSR with minimum polynomial and
no multiple roots also follow a fixed pattern. If k-th component of spectral
sequence is non zero then all (2jk) mod r components will be harmonics of
the k-th component where 1 ≤ j ≤ m− 1.
5. DFT of an LFSR sequence based on a polynomial with multiple roots does
not contain harmonic pattern of elements.
6. The Linear Complexity L of an n-periodic sequence is equal to Hamming
weight of its frequency domain associate. Three non zero spectral compo-
nents in example above verifies this fact.
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7. Time Shift Property. Let two sequences related by a time shift ut = st+τ ,
their DFTs Uk and Sk are related as:
Uk = α
kτSk, k = 0, 1, ...., n− 1 (12)
8. indices of non-zero spectral points of an LFSR sequence does not change
with the shift in LFSR sequence. A non-zero k-th component of DFT of an
LFSR sequence will always be non-zero. Any shift in LFSR sequence will
only change the value at this component by (12). Converse is also true for
zero spectral points of an LFSR sequence which will always be zero no matter
how much sequence is shifted.
9. Trace Representation of an LFSR sequence in Frequency Domain.
A binary sequence st can be represented in terms of trace function with
spectral componenets as follows:-
st =
∑
j∈Γ (n)
Tr
mj
1 (Ajα
−jt), t = 0, 1, ...., n− 1 (13)
where Tr
mj
1 is a trace function from F2m to F2, Aj ∈ F2m and Γ (n) is a set
of cyclotomic coset leaders modulo n.
10. Matrix Representation in Frequency Domain. DFT of st, being a
linear operator with respect to α ∈ GF (2m) from equation 2, can be written
in matrix form as:
(S0, S1, S2, ..., Sn−1)
T = D(s0, s1, s2, ..., sn−1)
T (14)
where
D =


1 1 1 ... 1
1 α α2 ... αn−1
1 α2 α2.2 ... α2(n−1)
. . . ... .
. . . ... .
. . . ... .
1 αn−1 α2(n−1) ... αn−1(n−1)


4 Transform Domain Analysis of a Product Sequence
In this section, transform domain analysis of a product sequence generated
through multiplication of two LFSR sequences is presented. This analysis forms
the basis for the combiner and filter generators that will appear in subsequent
sections. The spectral domain features discussed in Section-3.2 hold true for
product sequences as well. In addition, a linear structure existing in the fre-
quency domain representation of the product sequence is presented which ren-
ders itself useful for cryptanalysis of LFSR based sequence generators. The initial
state of an LFSR has direct relevance to the element β ∈ GF (2m) in (8) which
has been extensively exploited in algebraic and DFT based spectra attacks [19].
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Akin to this, there exists another phenemenon which has one to one correspon-
dence with initial states of LFSRs within a linear space G(f) containing cyclic
shifts of m sequences. These cyclic shifts in LFSRs sequences and their corre-
spondence to maximum period r posseses certain fixed patterns which exhibit
linear behaviour even when employed in nonlinear combiner generators. We have
observed that CRT interprets the shifts in LFSRs sequences and is considered
as our major contribution to classical theory of LFSRs and sequence generators.
As the product of two LFSR sequences is a building block of any non linear
boolean function, the idea has been discussed by considering a simple case of
two m sequences multiplied togather. The process has been generalized through
mathematical rationale later in this subsection where CRT based interpretaion
of shifts in LFSRs sequences has been discussed.
4.1 Time Domain Analysis of a Product Sequence
We build our analysis by starting with a simple case of multiplication of output
sequences of two LFSRs and illustrate our novel observations on fixed structures
existing in the frequency domian representation of product sequences. The ob-
servations of this special case will be generalized to a sequence generator in the
next section.
Let st be a key stream generated by multiplying the two LFSRs sequences
at and bt defined as
st = f(at, bt) (15)
where f(.) is a nonlinear function representing a term wise product. If period of
at is r1 and bt is r2, we have
st = ai . bi with 0 ≤ i < r (16)
where r = lcm (r1, r2). The linear complexity L of the sequence st in this case
satisfies
L(st) ≤ L(at)L(bt) (17)
where L denotes linear complexity of a sequence and the equality in (17) holds
only iff associated polynomials of at and bt are primitive and are greater than
2 [15].
Fixed Patterns in Cyclic Structures of LFSRs It has been observed that
there exists a specific relationship between the amount in shifts of product se-
quence st, period of individual LFSRs and shifts from their refernce initial states.
We generalize the process by giving its mathematical rationale followed by de-
tailed discussion through a small example. CRT allows mathematical represen-
tation of relationship observed between the shifts in individual LFSRs, their
corresponding periods and overall impact on product sequence st. We have a
important theorem here.
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Theorem 1. Let st ∈ GF (2
m) be a reference product sequence with period n
having two constituent LFSRs defined over primitive polynomials with individual
periods n1 and n2. With different shifts k1 and k2 in initials states of LFSRs,
resulting output sequnece ut is correlated to st by (10) where shift τ is determined
through CRT as
τ ≡ k1 (mod n1)
τ ≡ k2 (mod n2)
Proof. Within a cyclic group GF (2m), associated linear space G(f) of dimension
m contains 2m − 1 non-zero binary sequences by (9).
As st and ut both ∈ GF (2
m), they are shift equilvalents by (10) with unknown
shift value of τ .
The product sequnec st of at and bt can be expressed as
si = aj .bv (18)
where 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1 , 0 ≤ j ≤ n1 − 1 and 0 ≤ v ≤ n2 − 1.
Remark 1. While contributing towards a product sequence of length n with two
LFSRs, stream of LFSR-1 defined overGF (2p) with primitive polynomial and its
maximum period 2p− 1 is repeated δ1 times while LFSR-2 defined over GF (2
q)
with primitive polynomial as well and corresponding period 2q − 1 is repeated
δ2 where
δ1 =
lcm(n1, n2)
n1
, and
δ2 =
lcm(n1, n2)
n2
Remark 2. Within a sequence of period n for a product sequence, each value of
index j corresponds to all values of index v if and only if gcd(n1, n2) = 1.
From Remarks 1 and 2, any shift in LFSRs initial states will produce out-
put corresponding to some fixed indices of j and v which already existed in the
refernce sequence at some fixed place with initial states of LFSRs without shift.
With known values of j and v i.e. ki′s, CRT will give us the value of τ mod
n as
τ ≡ k1 (mod n1)
τ ≡ k2 (mod n2)
Transform Domain Analysis of Sequences 9
Example 1. Let we have a sequence st generated from product of two LFSRs
having primitive p[olynomials of g1(x)x
2+x+1 and g2(x)x
3+x+1. The period
n1 of stream at corresponding to LFSR-1 is 3 and n2 of bt corresponding vto
LFSR-2 is 7. The period n of st is 21.
Table 1 demonstrates product of two m sequences generated from these two
LFSRs.
Table 1. Product sequence of 2x LFSRs with n1 = 3 and n2 = 7
Shift Index 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
at a1 a2 a3 a1 a2 a3 a1 a2 a3 a1 a2 a3 a1 a2 a3 a1 a2 a3 a1 a2 a3
bt b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 b7 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 b7 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 b7
st s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13 s14 s15 s16 s17 s18 s19 s20 s21
We analyze the impact of shift on LFSR sequences and their behaviour in
cyclic stuctures of finite fields involved. We will shift the LFSR sequences one
by one and observe the fixed patterns which can be exploited in cryptanalysis
of the combiner generators. We can represent shifts in LFSRs sequences with k
and l as
st = ai+k.bi+l , with 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1 (19)
where k ∈ [0, n1 − 1] and l ∈ [0, n2 − 1]. Table 2 demonstrates the scenerio
where at is left shifted by one bit while keeping the bt fixed with initial state of
’1’.
Table 2. Product sequence with at shifted left
Shift Index 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
at a2 a3 a1 a2 a3 a1 a2 a3 a1 a2 a3 a1 a2 a3 a1 a2 a3 a1 a2 a3 a1
bt b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 b7 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 b7 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 b7
ut s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13 s14 s15 s16 s17 s18 s19 s20 s21 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7
Comparison of Table 1 with Table 2 reveals that shifting one bit left of at
and fixing the bt to reference initial state of ’1’ shifts st by seven units left.
Similarly, shifting another bit of at to left, brings a3 corresponding to b1 which
can be located in Table 1 at shift position 14. So two left shifts of at shifts st
by 14 units left with reference to bit positions in Table 1. Now we analyze the
impact of left shift of bt on st. Table 3 demonstrates the scenerio where bt is left
shifted by one bit while keeping the at fixed with initial state of ’1’.
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Table 3. Product sequence with bt shifted left
Shift Index 15 16 17 18 19 20 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
at a1 a2 a3 a1 a2 a3 a1 a2 a3 a1 a2 a3 a1 a2 a3 a1 a2 a3 a1 a2 a3
bt b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 b7 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 b7 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 b7 b1
ut s16 s17 s18 s19 s20 s21 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13 s14 s15
It can be easily seen that one left shift in bt shifts st by 15 units where b2
is corresponding to a1. Similarly, another left shift in bt shifts st by another 15
units bringing the b3 corresponding to a1. Subsequently, three left shifts in bt
with reference to initial state of ’1’ brings b4 corresponding to a1 which is at shift
index-3 in Table 1. Similar fixed patterns can be observed for simultaneous shifts
of LFSRs and it will be discussed with more detail in following paragraphs.
Let us model this fixed patterns in LFSRs cyclic structures and shifts in intial
states of LFSRs through CRT as
x ≡ k (mod n1)
x ≡ l (mod n2)
where k and l denote the amount of shifts in initial state of individual LFSRs
with reference to initial state of ’1’. The solution of CRT i.e. x(mod r) gives the
amount of shift in st with reference to ut as depicted in (10). Consider a scenerio
again where at is shifted left by one bit and bt is fixed with initial state of ’1’
and can be expressed as
x ≡ 1 (mod 3)
x ≡ 0 (mod 7)
The CRT gives the solution of 7(mod 21) which is index position of a2 corre-
sponding to b1 in Table 1 shifting the product sequence st by seven units left.
Consider another scenerio of simultaneous shifts in both LFSRs sequences where
at is shifted left by one bit and bt is shifted left by 3 bits with reference to their
initial states of ’1’ and can be expressed as
x ≡ 1 (mod 3)
x ≡ 3 (mod 7)
The CRT gives value of −11 which is 10 (mod 21), representing the product
sequence ut as 10 units left shifted version of st. This value matches to index
position of b4 corersponding to a2 in Table 1.
Our Observations related to direct correspondence of shift index with ini-
tial states of LFSRs and CRT calculations done modulo periods of individual
LFSRs are valid for any number of LFSRs in different configurations of nonlin-
ear sequence generators. These observations on classical theory of LFSR cyclic
structures with their CRT based interpretation are considered significant for
cryptanalysis.
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4.2 Frequency Domain Analysis of a Product Sequence
To compute the DFT of the sequence st using equation (2), we need to know
the minimium polynomial for st ∈ GF (2
m) which can be efficiently determined
through Berlekamp-Massey algorithm. It was demonstrated in last subsection
that a linear structure exists in the spectral representation of component se-
quences at and bt which propagates further in the DFT spectra of product
sequence st. Few interesting results are presented here duly illustrated by an
example:
1. Zero and non-zero positions of the DFT Spectra of st can be determined even
without knowing the minimum polynomial for st ∈ GF (2
m) while working
in the lower order associated fields of at ∈ GF (2
p) and bt ∈ GF (2
q), where
p & q < m. Any k-th component of DFT spectra of st is non-zero if and only
if Ak and Bk are both non zero, where Ak and Bk represents DFTs of at
and bt respectively.
2. With known non-zero DFT points for at and bt, Chinese Remainder Theorem
(CRT) can be used to determine non zero points of DFT spectra of st directly.
With n1 and n2 be the individual periods for at and bt respectively, we can
apply CRT as:
x ≡ k1 (mod n1)
x ≡ k2 (mod n2)
where k1 and k2 are non zero index positions of Ak and Bk respectively and
x is the position of non-zero componenet of DFT spectra of st within its
period n.
3. DFT of a product sequence with minimal polynomial having no multiple
roots follows a harmonic structure of its elements with αi ∈ GF (2m) and
its harmonics αi
jmod n ∈ GF (2m) with 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, appearing in DFT
spectrum.
4. Non-zero indices of DFT sequences also follow a fixed pattern. A k-th non-
zero component has its harmonics at all (2jk) mod n points with 1 ≤ j ≤
n− 1.
5. Shifting of any component sequence at or bt will impact the spectral com-
ponents of resulting sequence st by (12).
6. The zero components in the fourier transform of a product sequence st de-
fined over over GF (2m) are related to roots of its minimum polynomial g(x).
7. Consider two LFSR sequences at ∈ GF (2
p) and bt ∈ GF (2
q) being compo-
nents of a product sequence, their spectral components as Ak and Bk respec-
tively with 0 ≤ k ≤ N − 1. While working in base fields, can we determine
their corresponding frequency components of product stream zt ∈ GF (2
m)?.
Our results on this problem are being published somewhere else shortly.
Example 2. Consider a product sequence st generated from two LFSRs with
minimum polynomials g1(x) = x
3 + x+ 1 and g2(x) = x
2 + x+ 1.
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1. In time domain representation, we have following sequences.
Sequence at: 011 (of period 3)
Sequence bt: 0010111 (of period 7)
Sequence st: 001011000001010010011101110111011101 (of period 21)
2. From (2), frequency domain representations of these sequences are:
(a) Ak = 0, 1, 1
(b) Bk = 0, 0, 0, α
4, 0, α2, α
(c) To compute Sk, associated minimum polynomial is determined through
Berlekamp-Massey algorithm which is g(x) = x6 + x4 + x2 + x+ 1.
Sk = 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, α
9, 0, 0, 0, 0, α18, 0, 0, α15, 0, 0, 0, α18, 0, α9, α15
3. Following is to be notified here:-
(a) Non-zero DFT points in Sk clearly follow a linear behaviour as of time
domain representation where any k-th component is non-zero if and only
if Ak and Bk are both non-zero. CRT can be directly used to determine
these non-zero points.
(b) Harmonic pattern of DFT spectra are visible for Ak, Bk and Sk.
(c) Non-zero indices of DFT sequences also follow a fixed pattern. In case
of Sk, non zero DFT element at index 5 has its harmonics at indices
10, 20, 19 (40 mod 21), 17 (80 mod 21) and at 13 (160 mod 21).
(d) If we shift bt by one bit to left, resulting sequences in frequency domain
will hold shift property of equation (12).
Ak = 0, 1, 1
Bk = 0, 0, 0, α, 0, α
4, α2
Sk = 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, α
18, 0, 0, 0, 0, α15, 0, 0, α9, 0, 0, 0, α15, 0, α18, α9
(e) The zero components in the fourier transform of a product sequence st
defined over GF (2m) are related to roots of g(x) = x
6 + x4 + x2 + x+1.
As roots of g(x) are α alongwith its conjugates i.e. α2, α4, α8 and α16 so
first, second, fourth, eigth and sixteenth spectral components are zero.
The patterns observed in during time and frequency domain analysis of prod-
uct sequences will be applied to LFSR based sequence generators in the fol-
lowing sections. LFSR based sequence generators can be broadly divided in to
three main classes; non-linear filter generators, non-linear combiner generators
and clock controlled generators with few variants of shrinking generators [9].
Transform domain anlysis of filter and combiner generators will be presented in
following sections.
5 Transformed Domain Analysis of Filter Generators
The nonlinear filter generator consists of a single LFSR which is filtered by
a nonlinear boolean function f and is called as filtering function. In a filter
generator, the LFSR feedback polynomial, the filtering function and the tapping
sequence are usually publicly known. The secret parameter is the initial state of
the LFSR which is derived from the secret key of the cipher by a key-loading
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algorithm. Therefore, most attacks on filter generators consist of recovering the
LFSR initial state from the knowledge of some bits of the sequence produced by
the generator (in a known plaintext attack), or of some bits of the ciphertext
sequence (in a ciphertext only attack).
5.1 Time Domain Analysis of Filter Generators
Let st be an m-sequence with maximum period 2
m− 1 generated from an LFSR
whose length is m, then zt is the output sequence of a filter generator
zt = f(s0, s1, s2, ....., st−1) ∀t ≥ 0; (20)
where s0 are inputs of nonlinear function f coressponding to taps of an LFSR
as shown in Figure below.
Fig. 1. A Simple Filter Generator
In order to obtain a keystream sequence having good cryptographic prop-
erties, the filtering function f should be balanced (i.e., its output should be
uniformly distributed), should have large algebraic degree with large correlation
and algebraic immunity.
Now we present few important facts related to design parameters of filter
generators in time domain [9]:
1. The period of output stream zt is 2
m − 1 where m is degree of feedback
polynomial of LFSR which is primitive in most cases. The requirement of
long period is a direct consequence of shift property ofm-sequences as defined
in (10) within a linear space G(f).
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2. The output sequence of a filter generator zt is a linear recurring sequence
whose linear complexity L(z) is related to length of LFSR and algebraic
degree of nonlinear filtering function f . For any LFSR defined over GF (2)
with primitive feedback polynomial, an upper bound of linear span is
L(z) ≤
d∑
i=1
(li) (21)
where d is the degree of filtering function f and l is length of LFSR. Thus
for a higher L in sequence generator designs, d and l are chosen to be as
high as possible.
3. LFSR feedback polynomial should not be sparse.
4. The tapping sequence should be such that the memory size (corresponding
to the largest gap between the two taps) is large and preferably close to its
maximum possible value. This resists the generalized inversion attack [9]
which exploits the memory size.
5. If the LFSR tabs are equally spaced, then the lower bounds of linear com-
plexity will be
L(z) ≥ (ld) (22)
6. The boolean function used as a filtering function must satisfy following cri-
teria to be called as good cryptographic function. For details, readers may
refer to [12].
(a) The boolean function should have high algebraic degree. A high algebraic
degree increases the linear complexity of the generated sequence.
(b) It should have high correlation immunity which is defined as measure
of degree to which its output bits are correlated to subset of its input
bits. High correlation immunity forces the attacker to consider several
input variables jointly and thus decreases the vulnerability of divide-and-
conquer attacks.
(c) It should have high non-linearity which is related to its minimum distance
from all affine functions. A high nonlinearity gives a weaker correlation
between the input and output variables. This criteria is in relation to lin-
ear cryptanalysis, best affine appproximation attacks, and low order ap-
proximation attacks. Moreover, high non-linearity resists the correlation
and fast correlation attacks [22] by making the involved computations
infeasible.
(d) The recent developements in cryptanalysis attacks introduced the most
significant cryptographic criteria for boolean functions termed as alge-
braic immunity. There should not be a low degree function g for f which
satisfies f ∗ g = 0 or (f + 1) ∗ g = 0. Algebraic immunity is defined as
minimum degree function g for any bollean function f satisfying the said
criteria. Attacks exploiting this weakness in boolean functions are called
algebraic [11] and fast algebraic attacks [10], [8].
(e) A more recent attack on filter generators [25] exploiting the underlying
algebraic theory suggests an updated estimate of degree of non linear
boolean functions to resist the new kind of attack on filter generators.
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5.2 Frequency Domain Analysis of Filter Generators
This section provides DFT based analysis of filter generators which has been
known in public domain for few years. Few additonal results of our frequency
domian analysis has also been included here.
1. Irrespective of time domain requirement of a long period for a filter genera-
tor, DFT simplifies the associated high computational problem to any k-th
component of Fourier spectra through the relation
ατ = (Zk.A
−1
k )
k−1 (23)
where τ determines the exact amount of shift between at and zt and k is
index of any one component of DFT spectra.
2. To obtain specific component of Fourier spectra and limit the computational
complexity within affordable bounds, Fast Discrete Fourier spectra attacks
[19] propose an idea of selecting a suitable filter polynomial q(x), an LTI
system, to pass only specific spectral points and restrict all others which are
nulled to zero. To illustrate, we mention an important lemma here without
proof.
Lemma 1. Let q(x) be a polynomial defined over GF (2) with period r as
q(x) =
∑r
i=0 cix
i. We apply st to LTI system having a function q(x) and zt
is the output sequence. By theory of LTI system resposne to any arbitrary
signal and convolution in time domain, we have
zt =
r∑
i=0
cisi+t t = 0, 1, ..., n− 1 (24)
Converting the relation into frequnecy domain, we get
Zk = q(α
k)Sk k = 0, 1, ..., n− 1 (25)
where q(αk) is infact Qk; a way of interpreting DFT in terms of polynomials.
3. Selection of polynomial q(x) as a filter function is discussed at length in [17].
To summarize, steps of computations are :-
(a) Computing minimum polynomial g(x) of output stream zt by generating
a refernce sequence at which infact is a shifted version of zt.
(b) Selecting k amongst the coset leaders such that gcd (k, n) = 1 and
g(αk) = 0.
(c) Computing k-decimated sequence of reference stream at as ct = akt.
(d) Using Berlekamp-Massey algorithm, computing minimum polynomial
gk(x).
(e) Computing q(x) through a relation
q(x) =
g(x)
gk(x)
(26)
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4. Selection of q(x) can be done by direct factorization of minimum polynomail
g(x).
5. The DFT over binary fields can be computed for a filter generator without
requiring entire sequence. Authors in [19] have provided detailed algorithm
for computing DFT for sequences with fewer bits (equal to linear span of that
sequence or even lesser) as compared to the total period of the sequence. we
also propose an alternate approach to select q(x) in the next section dealing
with the combiner generators.
6. The consequence of Fast Discrete Fourier Spectra attacks on sequence gen-
erators introduced a new design criterion of spectral immunity. This criteria
implies that in order to resist the selective DFT attack, the minimal polyno-
mial of an output sequence of an LFSR based key stream generator should
be irreducible.
7. Recent studies have shown that low spectral weight annihilators are essential
for Fast Discrete Fourier Spectra attacks [29].
6 Transformed Domain Analysis of Combiner Generators
A combiner generator consists of number of LFSRs which are combined by a
nonlinear Boolean function. The Boolean function f is called the combining
function and its output is the keystream. The Boolean function f must have
high algebraic degree, high nonlinearity and preferably a high order of correlation
immunity.
6.1 Time Domain Analysis of Combiner Generators
Consider a combiner generator consisting of l LFSRs as shown in Figure 6.1.
Fig. 2. A Simple Combiner Generator
We denote the output sequence of the i-th LFSR as ai, its minimal polynomial
gi(x) and its length ri where i = 1, 2, ..., l. We will assume here that all ri’s are
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mutually coprime which is generally the case for the combiner generators. Let
f(a1t , a
2
t , ...., a
l
t) be a non linear function where f : GF (2
l)→ GF (2) takes input
from l LFSRs and produces the key stream zt as
zt = f(a
1
t , a
2
t , ...., a
l
t) (27)
The criteria for selecting LFSRs and boolean function in a combiner generator
are mostly similar to filter generators. However, few additions/differences related
to design parameters are as follows:
1. Contrary to filter generators where a single LFSR with larger length is used,
combiner generator employs multiple LFSRs with comparatively smaller
lengths. The requirement of primitive polynomials as feedback polynomi-
als stays as such for each LFSR.
2. The period of output keystream becomes lcm(r1, r2, ..., rl).
3. Since the combining function involves both Xoring and multiplication oper-
ation, few properties of linear complexities are reproduced here from [7], [26]
and [20]. Considering linear complexities of LFSR sequences a1t , a
2
t , ...., a
l
t as
L1, L2, ...., and Ll:
(a) the linear complexity of the sequence st = (a
1
t + a
2
t ) satisfies
L(st) ≤ L(a
1
t ) + L(a
2
t ), (28)
the equality holds if and only if the minimal polynomials of a1t and a
2
t
are relatively prime.
(b) From (17), the linear complexity of the sequence st = (a
1
t .a
2
t ) satisfies
L(st) ≤ L(a
1
t ).L(a
2
t ) (29)
(c) The linear complexity of zt = f(a
1
t , a
2
t , ...., a
l
t) satisfies
L(zt) = f(L1, L2, ....., Ll) (30)
4. The novel observations regarding fixed patterns of LFSRs, cyclic structures
existing in finite fields and their interpretation through CRT imply that
index of observed keystream bits in any reference stream directly reveals the
initial state of all LFSRs. CRT based interpretation of LFSR sequences in
relation to their periods thus reiterates the requirement of long period for
sequences of combiner generators.
6.2 Frequency Domain Analysis of Combiner Generators
In this section, frequency domain analysis of combiner generators is presented.
the application of selective DFT attacks on combiner generators is discussed in
detail with some novel observations. Developing on the theory of selective DFT
attack, a new efficient methodology is proposed to identify the initial states of
all LFSRs of combiner generators.
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In section-4.2, the direct mapping of product sequence between time and
frequency domains was demonstrated. Likewise, the Xoring operation existing in
most of the boolean functions also demonstrates similar mapping. For application
of boolean functions in combiner generators, following is important:
1. For the product terms of a non-linear boolean function, a term of DFT
spectra of the product stream is nonzero if and only if all the component
DFT terms are nonzero. With known non-zero DFT points for a1t , a
2
t , ...., a
l
t,
CRT can be used to determine non zero points of DFT spectra of st directly
as:
x ≡ k1 (mod r1)
x ≡ k2 (mod r2)
. ≡ ... .... ....
x ≡ kl (mod rl)
where k1, k2.....kl denote non zero index positions of a
1
t , a
2
t , ...., a
l
t and x is
the position of non-zero componenet of DFT spectra of st within its period
r.
2. For terms of a non-linear boolean function being Xored, any DFT spectra
term will be nonzero for which number of nonzero component DFT terms
are odd.
Let us explain these facts through an example.
Example 3. Consider a combiner generator consisting of 3 LFSRs with primitive
polynomials as g1(x) = x
2 + x+ 1, g2(x) = x
3 + x+ 1 and g3(x) = x
5 + x2 + 1.
The outputs of LFSRs in this case are m-sequences, denoted as a1t , a
2
t and a
3
t
respectively. Output stream of the generator is denoted as zt and a nonlinear
function f(x) is
f(x) = a1t .a
2
t + a
2
t .a
3
t + a
1
t .a
3
t
where period of zt in this case becomes 651 as lcm(3, 7, 31) = 651.
Mapping of operations is demonstrated in spectral domain using 2 as:
1. DFT of individual LFSRs:
(a) DFT of a1t :0, 1, 1
(b) DFT of a2t : 0, 0, 0, α
4, 0, α2, α
(c) DFT of a3t : only five non-zero DFT terms are at indices 15, 23, 27, 29 and
30 with values α29, α30, α15, α23 and α27 respectively.
2. DFT of product streams:
(a) DFT of a1ta
2
t : Corresponding to minimum polynomial of x
6 + x4 + x2 +
x+1 and period = 21, six non-zero components are α9, α18, α15, α18, α9
and α15 at indices 5, 10, 13, 17, 19 and 20. These indices can be easily
determined while working in component fields of GF (22) and GF (23) by
using CRT calculations as discussed in Section 4.2.
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(b) DFT of a2ta
3
t : With minimum polynomial x
10 + x5 + x4 + x2 + 1 and
period = 93, ten non-zero components are at indices 23, 29, 46, 58, 61,
77, 85, 89, 91 and 92.
(c) DFT of a3ta
1
t : Similarly with minimum polynomial x
15+x12+x10+x7+
x6+x2+1 and period = 217, fifteen non-zero components are at indices
27, 54, 61, 89, 108, 122, 139, 153, 178, 185, 201, 209, 213, 215 and 216.
(d) To verify the established facts, DFT of product of all three streams
has also been analyzed. For a1ta
2
ta
3
t having a minimum polynomial of
x30+x25+x24+x20+x19+x17+x16+x13+x10+x9+x8+x7+x4+x2+1
with period = 651, thirty non-zero DFT components are at indices
61, 89, 122, 139, 178, 185, 209, 215, 244, 271, 278, 325, 356, 370, 395, 418, 430,
433, 461, 488, 523, 542, 556, 587, 619, 635, 643, 647, 649 and 650. All these
indices can be determined directly from knowing the individual DFTs of
three LFSRs separately. For instance,
x ≡ 1 (mod 3)
x ≡ 3 (mod 7)
x ≡ 15 (mod 31)
gives result of 325 which exists amongst thirty non-zero DFT computa-
tions as well.
3. To see impact of Xor operation in frequency domain, DFT of zt with min-
imum polynomial x31 + x29 + x28 + x27 + x24 + x23 + x22 + x20 + x18 +
x17 + x16 + x15 + x13 + x11 + x10 + x9 + x8 + x7 + x5 + x4 + x2 + x1 + 1
is computed. Results reveal that all indices where number of non-zero DFT
terms for three product streams i.e. a1ta
2
t , a
2
ta
3
t and a
1
ta
3
t are odd, resulting
DFT term is non-zero. For instance indices at 5, 10, 13, 17, 19 and 20 where
only DFT of a1ta
2
t term is non-zero, resulting DFT for zt is also non-zero.
Similar is the case for other indices.
Selective DFT Attacks on Combiner Generators. In this subsection, pos-
sibilty of extending selective DFT attack on combiner generators has been dis-
cussed. The attack algorithm on non-linear filter generator has been explained
in [19] and [17]. However, direct application of selective DFT attack on combiner
generators has few limitations with regard to underlying design of these type of
sequence generators. For simplicity, case of m = L(at) has been considered here
where m is the number of known bits of key stream and at is the coordinated
scaled sequence of key stream.
1. As combiner generators entail multiple LFSRs, determination of element
β ∈ GF (2m) through coordinated scaled sequence doesnot lead to initial
states of all LFSRs directly.
2. In precomputation stage of the algorithm as discussed at length in [17], k-
decimation sequence of LFSR output sequence is computed followed by ap-
plying Berlekamp-Massey algorithm on it to determine its associated minium
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polynomial gk(x). With the help of this sequence ct, m x m circulant matrix
is obtained as follows
M =


c0 c1 c2 ... cm−2 cm−1
c1 c2 c3 ... cm−1 cm
c2 c3 c4 ... cm cm+1
. . . ... . .
. . . ... . .
. . . ... . .
cm−1 cm cm+1 ... c2m−3 c2m−2


3. In [19], this matrix is termed as coefficient matrix H and gk(x) is minimum
polynomial for αk where at is determined from (8) or through frequency
component as:
at =
∑
k
Trnk1 (Akα
tk) t = 0...n− 1 (31)
4. We propose another approach to compute gk(x) through factoring g(x). In
this case, step involving Berlekamp-Massey algorithm on k- decimated se-
quence will no longer be required. Setting up matrix M or H in this case is
by direct initializing of corresponding LFSR from any random state.
5. The output of selective DFT algorithm produces β = ατ . Using this value of
τ , left shift value for each LFSR sequence is determined by applying modular
computations of CRT with respect to individual periods ri’s of LFSRs as:
τ1 ≡ τ (mod r1)
τ2 ≡ τ (mod r2)
... ... ... ....
τl ≡ τ (mod rl)
6. Determine the initial state of each LFSR by applying individual shift values
τi’s to LFSRs sequences by using (8) within each field GF (2
m) where
βi = α
τi
bit = Tr
n
1 (βiα
t
i)
7. If τ is directly applied to each LFSR, number of computations involved in
shifting LFSR sequence is of the order to O(τ). CRT based interpretation of
LFSR shifts in initial states with respect to their periods save the last step
computations of selective DFT attacks.
Let us demonstrate these observations through an example.
Example 4. Consider the same combiner generator as in Example 3. Suppose we
have only 31 bits of keystream zt = [1011110001111010111001011010111]. With
a known structure of the generator, our attack will determine the initial state of
three LFSRs as follows:
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1. Initially, possibility of success of selective DFT attack on given combiner gen-
erator will be determined. Through Berlekamp-Massey algorithm, minimum
polynomial g(x) of keystream zt will be computed. Applying factorization
algorithm on g(x) gives its three factors as g1(x) = x
6 + x4 + x2 + x + 1,
g2(x) = x
10+x5+x4+x2+1 and g3(x) = x
15+x12+x10+x7+x6+x2+1.
So the selective DFT attack on this combiner generator is possible.
2. Generating a reference sequence at and decimating it with k = 58 with
gcd(58, 651) = 1 produces a coefficient sequence ct = 011010101110.
3. Applying Berlekamp-Massey algorithm on ct gives its associated minumum
polynomial of gk(x) = x
6 + x4 + x2 + x+ 1.
4. Circulant matrix will thus be of dimension 6 x 6 as:
M =


0 1 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0 1 1
0 1 0 1 1 1
1 0 1 1 1 0


5. From (26), filter polynomial q(x) = x25+x22+x19+x17+x10+x9+x8+x5+1.
6. The same results could be achieved from our observations as follows:
(a) From DFTs of a1t , a
2
t and a
3
t while working in finite fields of GF (2
3),
GF (23) and GF (25), k = 58 can be directly calculated to be non-zero
index for DFT of zt.
(b) Factorization done initially to check applicability of our selective DFT
attacks already showed g1(x) = gk(x) as one of the factor.
(c) We thus obtain the same q(x) as in step-5 above.
7. Computations of selcetive DFT algorithm give the result of τ = 19.
8. Finally, we can determine the left shift value in sequences for each LFSR by
applying modular computations of CRT with respect to individual periods
of LFSRs ri’s as
τ1 ≡ 19 (mod 3)
τ2 ≡ 19 (mod 7)
τl ≡ 19 (mod 31)
9. Having determined the exact shift value for each LFSR, their initial states
will be computed by using (8) within each field GF (2m) where
βi = α
τi
bit = Tr
n
1 (βiα
t
i)
10. The initial fills of LFSRs with 1 left shifts in a1t , 5 left shifts in a
2
t and 19
left shifts in a3t gives:
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Table 4. Initial States of 3 LFSRs
Initial State
LFSR-1 10
LFSR-2 101
LFSR-3 01111
We are thus able to recover exactly the initials states of all the LFSRs through
our novel approach of interpretting fixed patterns in LFSRs sequences through
CRT. Although the proposed approach was demonstrated on an illustrative ex-
ample, but it holds true for any configuration of combiner generators. The same
was tested with different non-linear combiner functions as well as with different
number of LFSRs.
6.3 Complexity Comparisons
Let us see the advantage of frequency domain analysis of LFSR based com-
biner generator over its time domain analysis. We will discuss computational
complexity in relation to most common attacks also. For a combiner sequence
having period N with l number of constituent LFSRs, complexity of Exhaustive
search is 2m1+m2+...+ml−1 where as for correlation attack complexity reduces to
2m1−1+2m2−1+ ...+2ml−1. To compute the complexity in case of selcetive DFT
attacks on combiner generators, calculations for preprocessing and actual attack
stage are [19]:
1. Preprocessing Stage. The computations during this stage are sum of follow-
ing:
(a) The complexity of computing minimum polynomial g(x) by applying
Berlekamp-Massey algorithm on st is O(L log2(L)) Xor operations where
L is linear complexity of st. Incase of using a relation g(x) =
∏
k∈I gk(x),
complexity is |I|[log2(L)]
3.
(b) The complexity of computing gk(x) is m log2(m)
2 for each k. For k ∈ I
with I representing set of coset leaders, complexity will be |I|[m (log2 m)
2].
(c) The complexity of computing g(αk) is O(N η(m) +m log2(N)) GF (2)
operations where η(m) = (m log m log log m) and N is the degree of
polynomial g(x).
2. Attack Stage. The complexity of this stage is sum of following:
(a) Passing our sequence st from LTI filter q(x) is actually time convolution
of q(x) and st which costs O(L) GF(2) operations.
(b) Last step of DFT spectra attack giving the output β is solving the system
of linear equations over GF(2) in d unknowns which has the complexity of
utmost O(dw), where w is Strassen’s reduction exponent w = log2(7) ≈
2.807.
(c) Determining left shift values for each LFSR through τi ≡ τ mod ri
and computing initial states of LFSRs are of order O(l) each and are
negligible, where l is number of LFSRs.
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Having established the comparisons of complexities between exhasutive serach,
correlation attack and selective DFT attack, let us map these to our example-
3 above. Exahustive search costs utmost 22+3+5−1 = 29 ≈ O(512) GF (2)
computations. With Probabilities of P (z = a) = 6/8, P (z = b) = 6/8 and
P (z = c) = 6/8, correlation attack largerly reduces the complexity to 22−1 +
23−1 + 25−1 ≈ O(21) GF (2) operations. Incase of selective DFT attacks, com-
plexity of preprocessing stage is O(279) and of attack stage is O(150) making
total of O(429) GF (2) operations. Thus it can be clearly stated that after one
time preprocessing computations of selective DFT attacks, complexity of actual
attack stage with O(150) is promisingly less as compared to exhastive search
attack. However, correlation attacks and their faster variants are more efficient
than DFT attacks in special scenerios where underlying combining function is
not correlation immune. Incase of correlation immune combining functions, se-
lective DFT attacks still provide propitious results and are advantageous over
the correlation attacks.
7 Applicability of Fast Discrete Fourier Spectra Attacks
on A5/1 Algorithm
In this section applicability of fast discrete fourier spectra attacks on A5/1 al-
gorithm is discussed. For clarity of context description of algorithm structure is
given first followed by discussion on possibility of selective DFT attacks on it.
7.1 Description of A5/1
A5/1 is a stream cipher built on a clock controlled combiner generator. Being a
Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) encryption algorithm, it has
been intensively analyzed and is considered weak becuase of number of succesful
attacks now. Details can be found in [4], [13], and [14]. The keystream generator
consists of three LFSRs, R1, R2 and R3 of lengths 19, 22 and 23 respectively as
shown in figure-3.
The taps of three LFSRs correspond to primitive polynomials x19+x5+x2+
x + 1, x22 + x1 + 1 and x23 + x15 + x2 + x + 1 and therefore, LFSRs produce
maximum periods. The registers are clocked irregularly based on decision of a
majority function having input of clocking bits 8, 10 and 10 of registers R1, R2
and R3 respectively. It is a type of stop and go clocking where those LFSRs are
clocked whose most significant bit (msb) matches to output bit of the majority
function. At each clock cycle either two or three registers are clocked, and that
each register is moved with probability 3/4 and stops with probability 1/4. The
running key of A5/1 is obtained by XORing of the output of the three LFSRs.
The process of keystream generation is as follows:-
1. Starting with key initialization phase, all LFSRs are initialized to zero first.
64-bit session key K = (k0, ..., k63) and publically known 22-bit frame num-
ber serve as initialization vector. In this phase all three registers are clocked
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Fig. 3. Design of A5/1 Algorithm
regularly for 86 cycles during which the key bits followed by frame bits are
xored with the least significant bits of all three registers consecutively.
2. During second phase, the three registers are clocked for 100 additional cycles
with the irregular clocking, but the output is discarded.
3. Finally, the generator is clocked for 228 clock cycles with the irregular clock-
ing producing the 228 bits that form the keystream. 114 of them are used
to encrypt uplink traffic from A to B, while the remaining 114 bits are used
to decrypt downlink traffic from B to A. A GSM conversation is sent as a
sequence of frames, where one frame is sent every 4.6 ms and contains 114
bits. Each frame conversation is encrypted by a new session key K.
7.2 DFT Attacks on A5/1
Applicablity of selective DFT attacks is preconditioned with following two sep-
arate cases:-
1. Case 1. If the minimal polynomial of output keystream zt is reducible, algo-
rithm 1 described in [19] is directly applicable.
2. Case 2. If another sequence yt ∈ GF (2
n) is determined such that vt =
zt ∗ yt, where ∗ is a term wise product, and L(vt) + L(yt) ≤ L(zt) and
L(vt + yt) +L(yt) ≤ L(zt), algorithm 2 described in [19] is applicable on zt.
Our analysis reveals that selective DFT attacks on A5/1 algorithm are not ap-
plicable. Detailed results are being published at other forum shortly
7.3 DFT Attacks on E0 Cipher
Selective DFT attacks on E0 cipher are possible with modifications in equations
derived in [3]. Our results on E0 cipher are being published at some other forums
shortly.
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8 Conclusion
In this report, we presented a transform domain analysis of LFSR based se-
quence generators. The inherent peculiarities of the LFSR product sequences
were evoked through novel patterns identified with the help of a CRT based
approach. These findings were then extended to the filter generators and more
particularly to the combiner generators. An effort was made to establish the
mapping of different operations from time domain to frequency domain. Novel
results on fixed shift patterns of LFSRs, their relationship to cyclic structures in
finite fields and CRT based interpretation of these patterns have been exploited
to reduce the computations required in the last stage of DFT spectral attacks
attacks on combiner generators. Subsequent to the transform domain analysis
of basic components of stream ciphers and discussion on applicability of fast
discrete fourier attacks on A5/1 algorithm, DFT based analysis of combiners re-
sistant to correlation attacks are considered as interesting cases for their analysis
in frequency domain and some initial results have shown good promise in this
regard.
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